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the committing court has general jurisdiction over the category of
cases involved, the fact that the legislature has removed, in the first
instance, jurisdiction over a specific proceeding does not totally
deprive the original court of all competence. Therefore, legal process
issued by that court as a result of an erroneous jurisdictional determination will not give rise to a claim for false imprisonment.
Application of foreign objects discovery rule extended to cause of
action in negligence and breach of warranty.
Pursuant to the traditional New York rule, a malpractice action
accrues upon the commission of the alleged act of malpractice.240 In
Flanaganv. Mount Eden GeneralHospital,'4 however, the Court of
Appeals held that where a foreign object is negligently left in a
patient's body,2 4 2 a cause of action for medical malpractice does not
accrue until the patient discovers or could reasonably discover the
malpractice. Although the Flanagandiscovery rule, subsequently
codified in CPLR 214-a, 44 evolved in the medical malpractice setting, the Supreme Court, New York County, in Reis v. Pfizer, Inc.,245
recently extended the rule's application to an action grounded in
negligence and breach of warranty for injuries resulting from allegedly defective polio vaccine.2 4 In Reis, an oral polio vaccine manu240 See,

e.g., Conklin v. Draper, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 829 (1930); Gilbert Properties,

Inc. v. Millstein, 40 App. Div. 2d 100, 338 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1st Dep't 1972), aff'd mem., 33
N.Y.2d 857, 307 N.E.2d 257, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973).
24124 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, §01 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
242 The plaintiff in Flanaganunderwent surgery for a gall bladder ailment in 1958. After
she began to experience pain in 1966, X-ray analysis revealed that surgical clamps were
lodged in her abdominal region.
23 24 N.Y.2d at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 872-73, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
214 CPLR 214-a, applicable to actions accruing on or after July 1, 1975, provides in
pertinent part:
An action for medical malpractice must be commenced within two years and
six months of the act, omission or failure complained of. . . provided, however,
that where the action is based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body of
the patient, the action may be commenced within one year of the date of such
discovery or of the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such
discovery, whichever is earlier.
It has been suggested by one commentator that in foreign object cases the 1-year period
is exclusive, i.e., the 2 1/2-year limitation period applicable to other medical malpractice
actions is not available to the plaintiff. CPLR 214-a, commentary at 66 (McKinney Supp.
1977). Contra, 1 WK&M 1 214-1.05 (plaintiff entitled to "whichever period is longer").
245 176 N.Y.L.J. 82, Oct. 27, 1976, at 8, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
2I In apparent conflict with Reis are three New York supreme court decisions in which
recovery was denied. Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 175 N.Y.L.J. 50, Mar. 15, 1976, at 8, col.
3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (decedent developed cancer 19 years after injection with radioactive
substance); Florulli v. Shrag, 174 N.Y.L.J. 8, July 11, 1975, at 12, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County), aff'd mem., 54 App. Div. 2d 683, 387 N.Y.S.2d 547 (2d Dep't 1976) (plaintiff's
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factured by defendant was administered to plaintiff's infant son in
October 1966 and January 1967. In February 1967, plaintiff contracted polio, allegedly as a consequence of physical contact with his
son.247 Plaintiff commenced an action in January 1974, alleging negligence and breach of warranty in the manufacture and distribution
of defendant's vaccine. Defendant moved for summary judgment on
the ground that both causes of action were time barred.24 In response, plaintiff contended that he could not reasonably have
learned of the causal relationship between his son's vaccination and
his illness until May 1973, when he read an article explaining that
polio could be contracted as a result of contact with recipients of the
vaccine. 24 9 Finding the action "akin" to one for medical malpractice

and concluding that the Flanagan rationale was applicable to the
facts in Reis, Justice Gellinoff found that plaintiff's action was
timely.250
In reaching this conclusion, the Reis court considered the policy
considerations underlying the judicial limitation of the discovery
rule to foreign object cases. The court noted that the chief reason
for this limitation is the difficulty in proving negligence and causation where something other than a tangible object has been left in
the body of a patient.25' Where other than real evidence is involved,
Justice Gellinoff pointed out, courts may be compelled to rely upon
testimony evaluating the professional judgment of the treating physician at a time long after the patient has been treated. 2 2 In such a

case, the possibility of stale and specious claims is apparent. In
weighing these considerations, the court maintained that, as in
Flanagan, the Reis case did not present a subjective claim based
intestate contracted hepatitis following blood transfusion); Granoff v. Ayerst Lab. Div. of
Am. Prods., 172 N.Y.L.J. 85, Oct. 30, 1974, at 20, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (plaintiff
sustained injury several years after ingesting drug).
27 176 N.Y.L.J. 82, at 8, col. 2.

M'Id. The court indicated that the negligence and breach of warranty causes of action
both were governed by the 3-year statute of limitations contained in CPLR 214. Id., citing
Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1975).
"1 176 N.Y.L.J. 82, at 8, col. 2. Defendant did not contest these assertions,
"presumably," the court noted, "because such contention would raise an issue of fact."
Defendant evidently assumed, albeit erroneously, that its motion for summary judgment
surely would be granted. Under traditional accrual rules, plaintiff's action indeed would have
been untimely, as the court noted. Id. As a result of defendant's failure to contest plaintiff's
allegations, it was unnecessary to determine the expiration of a reasonable time within which
the plaintiff could have discovered the defendant's negligence. Id.
211 Id., col. 3.
21 See id.
212 See id.
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upon professional diagnostic judgment or discretion. 253 Nor, stated
the court, did it entail the possibility of a feigned or frivolous claim,
or involve a causal break between the alleged negligence and the
injury suffered.2 4 In support of this position, the court noted that
defendant contested neither plaintiff's allegation that he had polio,
nor his allegation that he contracted it as a result of contact with
his son. 255 Furthermore, the court observed, it was undisputed
that plaintiff instituted suit immediately after he reasonably could
have discovered that his injury occurred as a result of defendant's
alleged tortious conduct. Consequently, the Reis court concluded25
that plaintiff's cause of action presented a sufficiently analogous
factual situation to bring it within the ambit of the discovery rule
25 7 and subsequently extended by other
formulated in Flanagan
25
courts.
2 Id.
254
2

Id.

M Id.

m In reaching its decision, the court noted that, unlike the plaintiff in Flanagan,the
plaintiff in Reis knew of his injury soon after the occurrence of defendant's allegedly tortious
act. Only the fact that the injury was the result of tortious conduct remained undiscovered
until a later date. In negating this distinction, the court relied upon Murphy v. St. Charles
Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 64, 312 N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dep't 1970). In Murphy, a case in which a
prosthesis broke 4 years after implantation in the plaintiff's hip, the Appellate Division,
Second Department, rejected the contention that the plaintiff's knowledge of the existence
of the device in his body distinguished the case from Flanagan.Id. at 67, 312 N.Y.S.2d at
980. Similarly, the Reis court concluded that although the present plaintiff had knowledge
of his illness, he was unaware of the defendant's negligence. It is submitted, however, that
Murphy is distinguishable. The Murphy plaintiff suffered no injury until the prosthesis broke.
Thus, the plaintiff in Murphy had notice of neither jnjury nor negligence at the time the
prosthesis was implanted, a situation similar to that in Flanagan.
"1 24 N.Y.2d at 430-31, 248 N.E.2d at 872-73, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27. Many courts refuse
to extend the discovery rule, adhering strictly to the distinction between foreign object claims
and medical treatment and diagnosis claims formulated by the Flanagan Court. See, e.g.,
Randall v. Weber, 45 App. Div. 2d 731, 356 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.) (negligent
diagnosis and treatment); Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint Diseases, 36 App. Div. 2d 31, 319
N.Y.S.2d 674 (2d Dep't 1971) (misdiagnosis of biopsy slides); McQueen v. County of Nassau,
83 Misc. 2d 865, 373 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975) (improper setting of broken
bone); Fonda v. Paulsen, 79 Misc. 2d 936, 361 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 46 App. Div. 2d 540, 363 N.Y.S.2d 841 (3d Dep't 1975) (negligent
examination of cancerous body tissue). But see note 258 infra.
24 N.Y.2d at 430-31, 248 N.E.2d at 872-73, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27. The discovery rule
has been extended by some lower New York courts beyond medical malpractice cases involving strictly defined foreign objects. See, e.g., Dobbins v. Clifford, 39 App. Div. 2d 1, 330
N.Y.S.2d 743 (4th Dep't 1972) (pancreas damaged during surgery 4 years earlier); Murphy
v. St. Charles Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 64, 312 N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dep't 1970) (prosthesis broke
4 years after its implantation in plaintiff's hip), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST.
JoHN's L. Ray. 500, 507 (1971); Le Vine v. Isoserve, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 747, 334 N.Y.S.2d 796
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1972) (radioactive contamination from defective isotope not discovered for 7 years).
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It is submitted, however, that Reis is distinguishable from
Flanagan.The plaintiff in Reis was not the recipient of the allegedly
defective vaccine, a point neglected in the court's opinion. In contrast, the plaintiff in Flanagan was the recipient of the tortious
instrumentality. In failing to limit the discovery rule to a recipient
plaintiff, the Reis court overlooked an important factual distinction.
Application of the discovery rule in Flanaganexposed the treating
physician to liability only to the patient on whom he operated, while
in Reis its application exposed the defendant manufacturer to liability to anyone who came in contact with the recipient of the vaccine. The vast difference in potential liability is a factor that should
have been considered by the Reis court."'
Nonetheless, the Reis decision signals the potential development of a common law discovery rule applicable to negligence actions independent of the medical malpractice discovery rule codified in CPLR 214-a. 60 Several factors militate against the development of such a rule, however, not the least of which is the fact the
Flanaganholding is quite narrowly worded. 61 Indeed, for this reason, subsequent cases that extended the discovery rule have been
subjected to criticism. " ' One court recently concluded that the legislature, too, has recognized "the strong policy considerations which
have mandated the strict construction of the Flanagan rule" by
211Le Vine v. Isoserre, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 747, 334 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1972), may have involved a similar situation. Plaintiffs brought suit for personal injuries and
property damage after having discovered that they and their home had been contaminated
by radioactivity. Plaintiff Harris D. Le Vine was contaminated by direct contact with defendant's allegedly defective isotope. His wife, two children, and home, however, presumably
were contaminated as a result of contact with him. The court applied the discovery rule to
the claims of all four plaintiffs without discussing the fact that Harris D. Le Vine was the
only plaintiff who came in direct contact with the isotope.
2"I This would be analogous to the development of the "continuous treatment" doctrine,
which tolls the running of the statute of limitations in a malpractice action until discontinuance of related professional services. This doctrine, like the discovery rule, arose as a means
of mitigating the harsh consequences occasioned from strict application of traditional accrual
rules. Although also codified in CPLR 214-a, the doctrine of continuous treatment has been
extended by case law to other areas of professional malpractice, such as law, public accounting, dentistry, and architecture. See The Survey, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 794, 795 (1975).
"I1See 24 N.Y.2d at 429, 431, 248 N.E.2d at 872, 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 25, 27. In his
practice commentary to CPLR 214, Dean McLaughlin maintained that: "Flanagan is perhaps
more significant for what it did not hold. The majority opinion took great pains to restrict
its ruling to foreign object cases." CPLR 214, commentary at 434 (McKinney 1972).
252See McQueen v. County of Nassau, 83 Misc. 2d 865, 373 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1975); Fonda v. Paulsen, 79 Misc. 2d 936, 361 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1974), rev'd on othergrounds, 46 App. Div. 2d 540, 363 N.Y.S.2d 841 (3d Dep't 1975);
1 WK&M 214-a.04; Comment, Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York: Conflict
and Confusion, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 276, 291-92 (1973).
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enacting CPLR 214-a. 63 Moreover, as Dean McLaughlin has suggested, it would be somewhat ironic if the discovery rule was applied
liberally in negligence actions yet strictly applied in those actions
which were the source of the rule-medical malpractice actions. 6 ,
Despite these obstacles, it is submitted that the Reis court's extension "of the Flanagan rule make[s] eminently good sense;"2 5 it
seems manifestly unjust to bar a plaintiff from asserting a cause of
action before he even knows of its existence.
Equitable conversion of surplus mortgage foreclosure proceeds.
It is a settled principle of New York law that there cannot be a
tenancy by the entirety in personal property. 66' When there is a
voluntary sale of real property held as a tenancy by the entirety, the
proceeds are considered personalty and the tenancy by the entirety
is terminated, creating either a joint tenancy or a tenancy in com2I Proewig v. Zaino, 176 N.Y.L.J. 80, Oct. 25, 1976, at 16, cols. 2, 3 (Sup. Ct. Nassau

County).
2' McLaughlin, Trends, Developments: New York Trial Practice, 176 N.Y.L.J. 92, Nov.
12, 1976, at 2, col. 4.
265 CPLR 214, commentary at 55 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
20 Originally, the New York rule prohibiting tenancies by the entirety in personal property was established by case law. See, e.g., Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 13 N.Y.2d 82, 192
N.E.2d 20, 242 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1963); In re Estate of Blumenthal, 236 N.Y. 448, 141 N.E. 911
(1923); In re Albrecht, 136 N.Y. 91, 32 N.E. 632 (1892). The principle since has received
statutory codification. EPTL § 6-2.1(a)(4); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-311(1) (McKinney
1969).
Only a husband and wife can hold property as tenants by the entirety. See Vlcek v. Vlcek,
42 App. Div. 2d 308, 310, 346 N.Y.S.2d 893, 896 (3d Dep't 1973) (there can be no tenancy by
the entirety in real property held by parties never married); Ackerman v. Ackerman, 78 Misc.
2d 1, 2, 342 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973), aff'd mem., 45 App. Div.
2d 856, 358 N.Y.S.2d 535 (2d Dep't 1974) (tenancy by the entirety may exist only between a
husband and wife validly married at time of transfer of property). EPTL § 6-2.2 is the
operative statute in determining the type of tenancy created by a disposition. The only
instance in which a tenancy by the entirety may exist appears in subdivision (b) which
provides: "A disposition of real property to a husband and wife creates in them a tenancy by
the entirety, unless expressly declared to be a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common." EPTL
§ 6-2.2(b).
As tenants by the entirety, no one spouse may unilaterally partition the real property,
nor dispose of any interest in such property which will adversely affect the other spouse's right
of survivorship. Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 312, 39 N.E. 337, 338 (1895). Tenancy by the
entirety is based on the common law concept of the unity of husband and wife. Id.; Ackerman
v. Ackerman, 78 Misc. 2d 1, 1, 342 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973);
9A P. ROHAN, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACEc
6-2.2[81[a] (1970). The right of survivorship can
be destroyed only by the dissolution of the marriage or the voluntary act ;f both husband
and wife. In re Estate of Dickie, 55 Misc. 2d 976, 978, 286 N.Y.S.2d 893, 896 (Sur. Ct. Erie
County 1968). For a general discussion of tenancies by the entirety, with emphasis on the
spouse's right to alienate his or her own interest, see Klorfein, Tenancies by the Entirety in
New York, 9 N.Y.L.F. 460 (1963).

